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Descriptive, Instrumental and Strategic Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Do they Drive the Financial Performance of Companies Differently? 
 
ABSTRACT 
PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the descriptive, instrumental, and 
strategic approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR) are related to corporate performance 
(CP) and to determine the nature of this relationship, if any. Using data collected by KLD Research 
Analytics and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the study examines the association between 
companies’ choice of approaches to the CSR and CSR-CP relationship.  
FINDINGS: Results of this study indicate that each of the three approaches to CSR—descriptive, 
instrumental, and strategic—are associated with CP, but in different ways. While the instrumental 
approach to CSR has a positive association with short-term measures of CP, the strategic approach 
is associated with short-term and medium-term measures of CP, and the descriptive approach has 
no definite association with CP at all. 
ORIGINALITY: This study integrates the prevailing justifications for CSR with the taxonomy of 
approaches to CSR—instrumental, descriptive and strategic—suggested in the literature. It has been 
argued that these frameworks influence managers’ conception of what constitutes effective 
stakeholder management and make a difference in how decision makers in an organization think 
and act in crafting the company’s social initiatives and in deciding what the company aims to 
achieve through these initiatives. By examining the association between companies’ approaches to 
CSR and stakeholder management of the CSR-CP relationship, the study offers another perspective 
of the ongoing debate in the social accounting literature about the accountability relationships 
between business and society.   
KEYWORDS: Stakeholder management, corporate social responsibility, corporate financial 
performance, approaches to CSR 
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INTRODUCTION 
Heightened attention to CSR has resulted in a significant increase in the resources that 
companies devote to supporting the demands of non-shareholding stakeholder groups (Porter and 
Kramer, 2011; Vitaliano and Stella, 2006). However, even as more businesses embrace CSR, 
evidence from practice continues to show that companies often treat CSR largely as an exercise in 
public relations, media campaigns, and reputation management (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009; 
Tinker and Gray, 2003). Popular press and scholars alike have expressed reservations about the true 
impact of corporate social initiatives, noting that existing CSR practices and processes, “have little 
to do with extending accountability and amount to nothing more than exercise in stakeholder 
management and corporate spin” (Cooper and Owen, 2007, p. 650). On the other hand, from the 
corporate perspective, while companies are increasingly realizing that stakeholder perceptions can 
be critical to corporate performance (CP)—and sometimes even survival (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; 
Orij, 2010; Russo and Fouts, 1997)—CSR initiatives have come under closer scrutiny in terms of 
the business benefits received from supporting the demands of disparate groups of stakeholders. 
Given the recent financial crisis, accurate assessment of the benefits received from various CSR 
initiatives has taken on new importance, as corporate boards try to balance their companies’ social 
obligations with the pragmatic imperative of the most effective utilization of shrinking resources 
(Boesso and Michelon, 2010; Maines and Sprinkle, 2010).   
Therefore, accurate measurement of the benefits received from CSR initiatives takes on 
added importance from both the companies’ and the stakeholders’ perspectives. It is not surprising, 
then, that the number of organizations and agencies that evaluate and rank companies on their 
corporate social performance (CSP) has increased in recent years. The reports and guidelines of 
some of the rating organizations, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Kinder, 
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Lydenberg, Domini Research and Analytics (KLD) attract considerable attention and publicity 
worldwide (Chatterji et al., 2009). The rating agencies seek to make a company’s social initiatives 
more transparent by analyzing the company’s plans and investments that purport to enhance future 
CSP. Such measures of CSR are important for both managers and stakeholders of a company since 
these measures have the potential to improve the level of organizational transparency and 
accountability and can even promote improved stakeholder relationships (Cooper and Owen, 2007).   
Notwithstanding the potential benefits, scholars have expressed reservations about the 
ability of these reporting standards, guidelines, and rankings to influence corporate social behaviors 
constructively (Burrit and Schaltegger, 2010; Edgely, Jones, and Solomon, 2010; Gray, Owen, and 
Maunders, 1988; Chatterji, et al., 2009; Cooper and Owen, 2007; Moneva, Archel, and Correa, 
2006; Tinker, Lehman, and Neimark, 1991). The social accounting literature has dealt with this 
issue at length and has critically evaluated the shortcomings of social audits, corporate social 
reporting, stakeholder dialogue reporting, and sustainability reporting and suggested ways in which 
these reports and rankings may contribute to heightened accountability and constructively influence 
corporate social behavior (e.g., Gray, 2002). 
In creating the framework for this study, we argue that the tension and the dilemma in the 
practice of CSR emanate, at least in part, from the confusion about the nature and purpose of CSR 
and stakeholder management that resides in the literature itself. The CSR and related stakeholder 
management theories have been advanced and justified in the literature based on markedly different 
approaches—descriptive, instrumental and normative—each of which involves different arguments, 
considerations, and implications (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  More recently, Porter and Kramer 
(2006) proposed a new, integrative way of approaching the relationship between business and 
society, which they called the strategic CSR approach. The descriptive approach outlines specific 
corporate characteristics and behaviors and describes how managers manage the interests of 
corporate constituencies. It reflects and explains past, present, and future states of affairs of 
corporations and their stakeholders. The instrumental approach establishes a framework for 
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examining the connections between the practice of stakeholder management and the achievement of 
various CP goals. The normative approach involves the notion that all stakeholders’ interests are of 
intrinsic value; that is, that each stakeholder group merits consideration for its own sake and not 
because of its ability to further the interests of some other group, such as shareholders (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995).  The strategic approach to CSR, while anchored in the justifications made by 
the earlier schools of thought, offers a framework companies can use to identify the social issues 
that benefit stakeholders while simultaneously strengthening the companies’ competitiveness.  It 
has been argued (Porter and Kramer, 2011) that such an approach to CSR will result in a symbiotic 
relationship between a company and its stakeholders since the success of the company and the 
success of the stakeholders become mutually reinforcing.   
The net result of managers’ attempts to derive guidance from these approaches to CSR 
results in companies that follow diverse approaches to stakeholder engagement and CSR (Jones, 
Felps, and Bigley, 2007; Young and Thyil, 2008). Following the normative approach, companies 
try to act as good corporate citizens in ways that honor ethical values and respect people, 
communities, and the natural environment, irrespective of the impact of such actions on CP. A 
company that takes the descriptive approach focuses on transparent accountability, such as 
providing basic information on the indicators that comprise the TBL—social, environmental, and 
financial performance. Companies that adopt the instrumental approach to CSR attempt to engage 
those stakeholder groups that can influence CP, thus creating accountability relationships that help 
them accomplish mutually important goals, as efficiently as possible.  Finally, companies that purse 
a strategic CSR approach, focus on social issues that are closely tied to the company’s business and 
undertake social initiatives whose social and business benefits are large and distinctive.  A company 
may choose one approach over the other or may combine different approaches to CSR, depending 
on what performance outcomes it aims to achieve from its CSR initiatives and stakeholder 
management. 
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In this study we examined the descriptive, instrumental and strategic approaches to CSR and 
the nature of their relationship to corporate performance.  The normative approach was not 
considered because it involves assessing the value orientation prevalent in a company, which makes 
the company consider interests of all stakeholder groups, irrespective of the impact of such actions 
on corporate performance.  Given the archival nature of the data set used in this study, which listed 
the corporate social performance of companies, we could not examine the normative approach to 
CSR and its association with CP.  While we recognize the fact that including the normative 
approach would have added an important dimension to the discourse on CSR, the nature of data 
constrained us from doing so. 
Despite the continuing debate, whether high level of social performance really leads to 
improved financial performance (Garcia-Castro, Arino, and Canela, 2010), the view that CSP and 
CP go hand in hand—has become commonplace in both the academic and professional 
communities. The conclusion that companies can improve their bottom line by responding to 
stakeholder concerns and acting in a socially responsible manner has been drawn on the basis of 
numerous empirical studies that have examined the CSR-CP relationship by correlating a 
company’s CSR initiatives with measures of CP. (See Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003 for a 
meta analysis of corporate social and financial performance.) However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no study has examined the association between companies’ choice of approach to CSR 
and the CSR-CP relationship.  
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
 The objective of this study is to determine whether the descriptive, instrumental, and 
strategic approaches to CSR are related to CP and what is the nature of this relationship, if any.  In 
this study, an argument is made that the relationship between CSR and CP may be better understood 
by using the framework in the literature to examine the differences in the approaches companies 
adopt towards CSR.  Using data collected by KLD and GRI during 2005, 2006, and 2007, the study 
examines whether companies that adopt an instrumental approach to CSR have improved CP in 
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terms of short-term measures and whether companies that adopt a descriptive approach to CSR have 
improved CP in terms of medium-term measures. Finally, the study investigates whether companies 
that combine the instrumental and descriptive approaches to CSR in a strategic way perform better 
in terms of both short-term and medium-term measures than do companies that adopt one or the 
other approach. Thus, the study offers yet another perspective of the ongoing debate in the social 
accounting literature about accountability relationships in CSR and stakeholder management.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 A review of the literature shows that, as contributions to stakeholder management and CSR 
have grown, they have also become diffused (Friedman and Miles, 2002). This section examines the 
prevailing justifications for CSR and integrates them within the taxonomy of approaches to CSR—
normative, instrumental, descriptive and strategic—suggested in the literature (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). A series of hypotheses related to the company’s approach to CSR and their 
association with company performance are generated based on this integration. 
Prevailing Justifications for CSR 
Scholars have noted four primary schools of thought, each providing its own justifications 
for CSR (Husted, 2000; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Singer, 2010): moral obligation, sustainability, 
corporate reputation, and license to operate. The arguments behind the moral obligation approach 
are that companies have a duty to “do the right things” and to be “good citizens” in ways that honor 
ethical values and respect people, communities, and the environment (Falck and Heblich, 2007). 
The principle of sustainability emphasizes corporate stewardship of the environment and the 
community—that is, operating in ways that avoid behaviors that are socially and environmentally 
detrimental (Clement, 2005). The reputation argument encourages companies to pursue social 
responsibility initiatives as a way of building reservoirs of goodwill and of improving their images 
(Peloza, 2006). Finally, the license-to-operate approach views CSR as a way for companies to seek 
implicit or explicit approval from host governments, communities, or other stakeholders about 
issues related to the companies’ operations (Fombrun, 1996; Graves and Waddock, 1994). 
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One can relate the four justifications for corporate social initiatives to the approaches to 
CSR—descriptive, instrumental, normative, and strategic (Jones, et al., 2007). The moral obligation 
justification emanates from the normative approach to CSR since it prescribes how stakeholders 
should be treated based on some underlying moral or philosophical principles (Young and Thyil, 
2008). The sustainability and license-to-operate views, on the other hand, follow the descriptive 
approach since they describe the behaviors of companies as they interact with stakeholders 
(Berman, Wicks, Kotha and Jones, 1999). These justifications also imply both mandatory and 
voluntary reporting of CSP.  The reputation justification follows the instrumental approach in the 
sense that they contend that companies that create a compact with a carefully selected group of 
stakeholders will have competitive advantage over companies that do not.  Finally, the strategic 
CSR approach is based on the arguments that good citizenship is a sine qua non of CSR (the moral 
obligation justification), and that companies need to be attuned to the evolving social concerns of 
stakeholders (license to operate view), and develop measurable corporate social goals; and track 
results over time (sustainability and reputation argument). 
One can see from the discussion above that although a rich literature on CSR has emerged 
over the years, it does not offer clear practical guidance to managers in identifying, prioritizing, and 
addressing the myriad social issues that a company can address (Tinker, 1984). A company’s social 
initiatives often become diffused among numerous efforts aimed at responding to different 
stakeholder groups (Jones, et al., 2007), which is one reason that the companies’ social initiatives 
often look like a “hodgepodge of uncoordinated CSR and philanthropic activities…that neither 
make any meaningful social impact nor strengthen the company’s performance” (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006, p. 9). 
CSR and Company Performance 
Scholars have proposed various arguments about how a company’s social performance may 
influence its financial outcomes (Clarkson, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999; McWilliams, Siegel, and 
Wright, 2006; Wood, 1991). The most common view is that a high level of social performance 
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helps build good relationships based on mutual trust and cooperation with stakeholders, which 
enhances the firm’s performance. Researchers interested in the way companies interact with various 
stakeholders have generally tried to determine whether attending to the needs of the organization’s 
various stakeholders, beyond just shareholders, contributes to the company’s ability to gain and 
sustain a performance advantage. To this effect, a number of studies have examined the relationship 
between the level of a company’s social performance and corporate financial outcomes and have 
generally found that there is a positive association between the two. (For reviews see Laplume, 
Sonpar, and Litz, 2008; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Roman, Hayibor, and Agle, 
1999.) However, there is still considerable debate about the nature of this relationship (Doh, 
Howton, and Siegel, 2010; Van Beurden and Gossling, 2008), and much more remains to be 
understood about this relationship (Choi and Wang, 2009; Coombs and Gilley, 2005).  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Following the findings of prior research, we acknowledge that CSR can be “an efficient 
management strategy” (Baron, 2003) and an “investment in a company’s future” (Fombrun, 1996; 
Falck and Heblich, 2007), but we also argue that companies can adopt alternative approaches to this 
end. More specifically, we argue that the alternative approaches—the descriptive, the instrumental 
and the strategic approaches—suggested in the literature influence managers’ conceptions of what 
constitutes effective stakeholder management, so they affect how decision makers in an 
organization think and act in crafting the company’s social initiatives and defining what the 
company aims to achieve through these initiatives.   
Even without previous empirical verification of the relationship between a company’s 
approach to CSR and CP, its adoption of one approach or the other to CSR can be linked to 
variations in CP outcomes through analytical arguments. According to stakeholder-agency theory 
(Hills and Jones, 1992), managers can be seen as the agents of all stakeholders. However, 
stakeholders differ among themselves with respect to the importance of their stake in the firm and 
their power vis-a vis the managers (Greenley, Hooley, Broderik, and Rudd, 2004). Hills and Jones 
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(1992, p. 132) argued that there is “no reason to assume that stakeholder-agent relationships are in 
equilibrium at any particular time.” In fact, there is often considerable friction in the stakeholder-
agent relationship because of “some stakeholders’ ability to retard equilibrating adjustments that are 
unfavourable to them” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 78).  As a result stakeholders are drawn 
into relationships with company’s managers to accomplish mutually important goals as efficiently 
as possible.  This would imply that managers may adopt an instrumental approach to stakeholder 
management with organizational performance outcomes designed to achieve short-run goals. 
While such an approach may be questionable to some from the ethical and moral 
perspectives (Tinker et al., 1991), approaching CSR in an instrumental way can give a company 
advantages in identifying trends or changes in the market, allowing the company to act quickly to 
establish itself at the forefront of the change (Falck and Heblich, 2007). The instrumental approach 
to CSR and stakeholder management may also help the company build competencies proactively by 
improving its scanning skills, processes, and systems that increase the organization’s preparedness 
for change, turbulence, and crises (Orlitzky et al., 2003). However, when companies approach CSR 
and stakeholder management in an instrumental way, what they aim to achieve keeps changing 
(Greenley et al., 2004) because the performance goals that the company targets are the outcomes of 
preferences of one group or another based upon their ability to contribute to the goals the company 
is trying to achieve. Therefore, we propose: 
H1: An instrumental approach to CSR is associated with superior company performance 
in terms of short-term measures. 
When companies approach CSR in a descriptive manner, they try to satisfy the demands of 
multiple and diverse stakeholder groups and to pursue social initiatives that may or may not be 
directly related to corporate financial performance goals. Researchers have often described CSR 
initiatives that emanate from the descriptive approach as “investments” comparable to those made 
in R&D or employee training because such initiatives lead to future growth potential in the same 
way (Fombrun, 1996). For example, a sound relationship with employees, a stakeholder group, may 
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increase the firm’s ability to attract and retain employees and to increase employee commitment and 
effort, leading to improved efficiency and productivity (Colbert and Kurucz, 2007). Similarly, a 
good relationship with customers, another stakeholder group, may lead to a stabler and more 
attached customer base and enhance brand value (Clement, 2005). A good relationship with the 
community, yet another stakeholder group, may lead to positive community involvement in 
providing infrastructure and support for the company’s growth (Epstein and Widen, 2011; Burke, 
Logsdon, Mitchell, Renier, and Vogel, 1986). 
To assure multiple and diverse stakeholder groups that their interests are being coordinated 
in ways that lead to favorable outcomes consistent with their expectations, a company would 
volunteer to participate in monitoring devices, such as CSR reporting and other public reporting 
mechanisms, beyond mandatory requirements. Although companies often employ a variety of 
communication mechanisms in their attempts to reach and engage in dialogues with various 
stakeholder groups, externally certified voluntary disclosure is the cornerstone of stakeholder 
reporting (Epstein and Birchard, 2000; GRI, 2006). GRI and other institutional bodies have focused 
on this important issue. At the same time, in order to respond effectively to a disparate set of 
entities, companies that approach CSR from a descriptive perspective adopt the TBL framework, 
which outlines the economic, social, and environmental issues that firms must address. Colbert and 
Kurucz (2007) reported that, of the 250 largest multinational corporations, 68 percent had adopted 
TBL public reporting by 2005. The KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility 
Reporting also noted an increase of 7 percent and 10 percent for separate reports and annual report 
information pertaining to CSR between 2002 and 2005, respectively (KPMG, 2005).  These 
statistics show the increasing use of corporate reporting immediately preceding the period for which 
data was collected for this study.  The most recent KPMG Survey (2011) shows that 95 percent of 
the Global Fortune 250 companies now report their corporate responsibility activities and in the 34 
countries that were surveyed, reporting has increased by 11 percent since 2008, to 64 percent 
overall.  
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In terms of performance outcomes, companies that take the descriptive approach to CSR 
may build core values that provide stakeholders a sense of meaning and belonging. Falck and 
Hiblich (2007) observed that CSR is usually a long-term proposition, a specifically planned and 
carefully supervised investment in a company’s future, and Choi and Wang (2009) contended that 
the trust that characterizes any sound stakeholder relationship takes a long time to build. Therefore, 
by its very nature, a descriptive approach is unlikely to be linked with short-run performance goals. 
However, if such an approach is based on an efficient management strategy of investment in the 
future, it may contribute to improvements in CP over the medium-term. Therefore, we propose the 
following: 
H2: A descriptive approach to CSR is associated with superior company performance in 
terms of medium-term measures. 
Although the instrumental and descriptive approaches to CSR and stakeholder management 
lead managers to think and act differently when it comes to crafting the company’s social initiatives 
and to determining the performance goals that the company aims to achieve through these 
initiatives, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. After conducting an extensive review of 
different approaches to stakeholder management and CSR, Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
concluded, “the three approaches to stakeholder are nested within each other” (p. 74). The external 
shell—the descriptive approach that presents and explores stakeholder relationships—is supported 
at the second level by the instrumental approach, which shows that, if certain practices are carried 
out in the course of stakeholder management, then certain corporate outcomes can be obtained. 
More recently, Porter and Kramer (2006) operationalized this thinking by introducing the concept 
of strategic CSR.  
The strategic CSR approach while anchored in the justifications made by each of the three 
approaches to CSR, offers a framework companies can use to identify the social issues that benefit 
stakeholders while simultaneously strengthening company competitiveness. The inclusion of a 
descriptive approach increases the social legitimacy of the company (Roberts, 1992), especially 
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since this approach involves externally certified voluntary disclosures, such as GRI reporting. In 
addition, a firm’s positive relationships with its stakeholders helps it build resources that are 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable, thereby contributing to the company’s competitive 
advantage (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Choi and Wang, 2009; Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2011). 
Previous researchers have also noted that companies that use CSR initiatives in a descriptive way 
can build positive reputations with stakeholder groups (McWilliam and Siegel, 2001; Sen and 
Bhattacharya, 2004; Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2011), which have particularly enduring effects 
because of the inability of competitors to imitate them (Choi and Wang, 2009).  
A company’s decision to channel its resources based upon its stakeholder preferences may 
also lead to a performance advantage for the firm (Choi and Wang, 2009). Managing the CSR 
initiatives of the firm in terms of doing things better than and differently from how competitors do 
them (the instrumental approach) can contribute to competitive success in the same way that other 
aspects of competitive strategy do (Porter and Kramer, 2006). By linking the CSR initiatives to the 
likely preferences of their stakeholders, companies ensure that their corporate capabilities are 
particularly suited to helping create value for the stakeholder groups whose needs they are trying to 
address (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Therefore, we propose that:   
 H3: A combination of the descriptive and instrumental approaches, in ways that lead to a 
strategic CSR approach, is associated with superior financial performance in terms of 
both short-term and medium-term measures. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample 
The initial sample for this study, obtained from the KLD database, consisted of the one 
hundred companies recognized as Business Ethics’ 100 Best Corporate Citizens for 2005, 2006, and 
2007. More recent data could not be used in this study because in recent years data has been 
reported differently, and combining two forms of data set would not have allowed us to examine the 
association we intended to examine in this study. This group of companies was particularly 
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appropriate because they are leaders in terms of their stakeholder management and CSR efforts and 
are likely to have a definitive predisposition toward their approaches to CSR. Because some 
companies received the award more than once, there were 300 observations and 188 companies. In 
addition, we collected data about social performance for each company and each year from GRI 
reports on the same 188 companies. 
Measures of Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) 
Data on the companies’ financial performance was collected from Thomson’s Datastream, 
one of the largest financial statistical databases. CP was measured using both short-term and 
medium-term measures. The short-term measures used in the study included EBITDA and the 
companies’ market value at fiscal year-end (ENT_VALUE). We chose EBITDA because it is less 
subject to managers’ discretionary policy choices regarding surplus resources than many other 
accounting-based measures, so it provides a better reflection of a company’s actual short-term 
financial performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003). In addition, short-term performance was measured 
using companies’ market values at the end of each of the three fiscal years because it reflects the 
present assessment of the company’s abilities (Choi and Wang, 2009).  
The medium-term financial measures consisted of capital expenditure investments 
(CAP_EXPEND) and intangible assets (INTANGIBLES). We chose capital expenditure 
investments because they indicate the longer-term initiatives that companies are pursuing to 
improve their future performance. Intangibles, which accrue from present and past performances of 
the company, were chosen as the second measure of medium-term performance because they are 
the result of longer-term efforts, and they have the potential to contribute to and sustain a 
company’s performance over a longer period. Following extant studies, we used both concurrent 
performance data and a lag of one year (Roberts, 1992; Choi and Wang, 2009).  
Measures of Corporate Social Performance (CSP) 
Data on CSP was collected from the KLD SOCRATES database, a comprehensive research 
database that measures companies’ CSR performance using social, environmental, and governance 
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ratings. Companies are rated in seven areas: environment, community, corporate governance, 
diversity, employee relations, human rights, and product quality and safety. The final rating in each 
of the seven areas of CSR is based upon an assessment by KLD analysts after an exhaustive 
investigation of public records, including more than 14,000 global media sources, company 
websites, reports from governmental agencies and NGOs, financial reports filed with regulatory 
agencies, company annual reports, direct communications with company officers, and visits to 
company facilities. In each area, the ratings indicate a company’s strengths and weaknesses on a 
five-point scale. To arrive at each score, KLD analysts subtract the weakness scores from the 
strength scores for the attributes in each of the seven areas of CSR (Mattingly and Berman, 2006). 
A low rating in an area indicates weakness or the absence of strength, while a high rating indicates 
the presence of positive activity with regard to the specific issue or the absence of weakness.  
KLD data, considered “the most comprehensive and prominent data” on stakeholder 
management (Coombs and Gilley, 2005, p. 830) and “the de facto standard at the moment” for 
measuring stakeholder management and CSP (Waddock, 2003, p. 369), have been used extensively 
in scholarly research to operationalize companies’ social performance (Coombs and Gilley, 2005; 
Graves and Waddock, 1994; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Choi and Wang, 2009). Even though 
proponents of the normative approach to CSR have occasionally criticized the use of KLD data 
because of its lack of connection with corporate values (Johnson and Greening, 1999), given the 
focus of this study the database was appropriate. We also used the overall CSR performance score 
of each company, which was calculated as the average of the scores obtained in the seven sub-areas.  
Measures of an Instrumental Approach to CSR 
We measured a company’s instrumental approach to CSR by calculating the variance  for 
each company in the seven areas of CSP for each of the three years; and if the variance was greater 
than the average variance for all observations for a given year, it was deemed to be an evidence that 
the company’s CSR initiatives were linked to its stakeholders’ preferences, so the company was 
approaching CSR in an instrumental way. By taking this approach, we captured what is at the core 
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of the instrumental approach—a prioritization process that selectively addresses the CSR issues 
related to the demands of stakeholder groups.  A dummy variable, “KLD_VAR,” with a value equal 
to 1 is assigned to a company in this case, and 0 otherwise. Examining the variances in the sample’s 
means in order to understand variability/consistency in a company's practices is an approach that 
has been used in many extant studies (e.g. Simerly and Li, 2000; Choi and Wang, 2009).  
Measures of a Descriptive Approach to CSR 
We measured a company’s descriptive approach to CSP in two ways, both of which relied 
upon GRI reports. The GRI guidelines were developed as a way of helping organizations to report 
on their environmental, social, and economic performance—triple bottom line (TBL).  The GRI has 
a high reputation, and many companies use its reporting guidelines. Following the GRI guidelines, 
companies provide basic information on the indicators that comprise the TBL. In particular, the 
framework integrates several types of disclosure in a structured set of seventy-nine indicators1 that 
are further aggregated into economic, environmental, and social performance measures. Companies 
may also voluntarily issue a summary compliance table outlining their compliance with the GRI 
guidelines.  
Following the GRI guidelines, companies provide basic information on the indicators that 
comprise the TBL so stakeholders can understand the contributions of the reporting organizations. 
The concept of TBL does not mean that companies are required to maximize returns across the 
three dimensions of performance; the GRI simply provides a corporate social reporting model, and 
companies report their social responsibility credentials, labeling themselves as GRI reporters. Such 
an approach to reporting CSP clearly follows the descriptive approach to CSR.   
To indicate that a company was following the descriptive approach, we first employed a 
dummy variable (GRI) of 1 if the company had made the voluntary decision to apply the GRI 
guidelines for its CSR reporting. Next, we measured the level of adherence to the GRI standards by 
counting the number of indicators for which the company had reported. In addition, we used content 
                                                
1 The number of items does not include the strategy and profile disclosure required by the GRI framework. 
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analysis to analyze the company’s summary compliance table to determine on how many indicators 
among those recommended by the GRI the company was reporting. The content analysis method is 
a line of research widely adopted to extract reliable and valid information from narrative data 
(Krippendorff, 2004). In analyzing companies’ sustainability reports, we matched each sentence 
with all seventy-nine items and coded it with a score of 0 if it provided no information and with a 
score of 1 if it provided one of the required GRI indicators2. The level of adherence to the GRI 
framework was measured by counting the frequency of items since the same sentence can disclose 
more than one indicator. Similarly, if the same information was repeated in the report, this 
information was considered only once. Based upon these two analyses we calculated the DSCORE 
as the number of indicators reported by each company, divided by the maximum number of 
indicators that could be disclosed (79). The measure ranged from 0 (no GRI indicators are reported) 
to 1 (all GRI indicators are reported). Together, these two measures allowed us to verify the extent 
to which the companies were providing basic information on the indicators that comprise the TBL.  
Measures of Control Variables 
Data on control variables was collected using Datastream. We selected size and industry as 
control variables based on the recommendations made in prior studies (Ullman, 1985; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2000) that investigated the association between CSR and financial performance. 
According to Burke et al. (1986), as firms grow, they are more likely to adopt CSR principles 
because of the increased pressures from stakeholders. The average cost of implementing CSR 
initiatives may also be proportionately less for large firms than for smaller ones (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001) since large size often facilitates economies of scale or scope (Roberts and Dowling, 
2002). We measured firm size by the natural logarithm of the number of employees, rather than 
                                                
2 One of the authors performed all the coding activity. Coding activity may suffer from consistency problems in two 
areas: across coders and over time. By using only one coder, we avoid the first problem and improve the overall 
reliability of the analysis. In order to ensure the reliability and validity of the data collected and to determine whether 
the second problem played a role, the same author repeated the coding procedure over a sub-sample three months after 
the first coding. This generated a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.95 (Krippendorf, 2004), indicating internal consistency in the 
coding procedure.  
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other indicators like revenue or sales, because companies in our sample come from many different 
industries with very different revenue and sales patterns.    
Industry effects may also influence a company’s CSR initiatives and its performance 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001). This measure was particularly important 
because companies in the sample came from nine industries (basic industries, cyclical consumer 
goods, non-cyclical consumer goods, cyclical services, non-cyclical services, financial, general 
industrial, information technology, and utility). Since the focus of this study was on examining the 
relationship between the approach companies adapt to CSR and CP, it was necessary to recognize 
“business exposure,” that is, the degree to which a firm is vulnerable to its environment. Firms in 
industries like consumer goods, utilities, and oil and natural gas are under substantial scrutiny from 
a broad range of stakeholders (i.e., they face significant business exposure), so they are more likely 
than firms in other industries to adopt a certain approach to CSR. The industry in which a firm 
operates can also affect the pressures it faces from stakeholder groups, influencing its approach to 
CSR. For example, consumer product companies see their largest exposure and greatest pressure 
from customer groups, while firms in industrial sectors like utilities and oil and gas face the greatest 
pressure from stakeholders who are concerned about environmental impacts.  
MODELING THE EFFECT OF APPROACHES TO CSR AND CFP 
The data for this study consisted of CSR ratings for the one hundred and eighty eight 
companies that were ranked as the best corporate citizens over three years (2005-2007). Since many 
companies made the list more than once during the three years and since CSR ratings may have 
varied, the data set is panel data. Panel data have the between-subjects information among subjects 
for any given time period, and they have the within-subjects information for the same subjects 
across time (Wooldridge, 2002). Given the nature of the data, one finds different error variances for 
the different cross-sections, and with such cross-section heteroskedasticity, the OLS standard errors 
are inconsistent. In addition, because we included in our research models time-invariant variables 
(industry effects), panel data modeling with fixed effects was deemed inappropriate for analysis. 
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Therefore, we performed a panel-corrected standard error linear model, assuming within-unit 
homoskedasticity3. The OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors are conservative, so 
they are valid alternatives to feasible GLS estimates (Beck and Katz, 1995). To perform a 
robustness check of our results, we ran all regression models using both robust (clustered) variance 
estimates, which provided similar results. We also performed a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for 
simultaneity in the relationship between corporate financial performance and social performance (as 
suggested in Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and found no evidence of simultaneity. Thus, the 
estimates provided by the panel-corrected standard error model are consistent. 
To test hypothesis 1, which predicted an association between an instrumental approach to 
CSR and CP in terms of short-term performance measures, we specified model (1) to test this 
relationship: 
(1) 
∑
=
++
++++=
8
1
54
3210 *__
ind
inditindit
ititititit
Industrysize
OVERALLVARKLDVARKLDOVERALLerformanceFinancialP
αα
αααα
 
To test hypothesis 2, which predicted an association between a descriptive approach to CSR 
and CP in terms of medium-term performance measures, we tested two models, model (2) with CP 
concurrent with the CSR and model (3) with CP after a one-year lag. We took this approach to 
testing the relationship because the descriptive approach to CSR may involve a time-lagged 
relationship with CP, and testing the relationship with concurrent and time-lagged performance tests 
the hypothesized association in a robust way. Accordingly, the following two models were 
specified: 
(2) 
€ 
FinancialPerformanceit =α0 +α1OVERALLit +α2GRIit +α3DSCORE +α4GRIit *OVERALLit +
+α5sizeit + α6indIndustryit ind
ind=1
8
∑  
                                                
3 We also performed the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and did not identify any serial correlation in 
the error term of our models. 
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(3) 
€ 
FinancialPerformanceit+1 =α0 +α1OVERALLit +α2GRIit +α3DSCORE +α4GRIit *OVERALLit +
+α5sizeit + α6indIndustryit ind
ind=1
8
∑  
To test hypothesis 3, which predicted that a combination of the descriptive and instrumental 
approaches is associated with superior financial performance in terms of both short-term and 
medium-term performance measures, we once again tested the relationship with two models, model 
(4) with CP concurrent with the CSR and model (5) with CP after a one-year lag.  
(4)  
€ 
FinancialPerformanceit = α0 +α1OVERALLit +α2KLD_VARit +α3GRIit +
+α4KLD_VARit *GRIit +α5sizeit + α6ind Industryit ind
ind =1
8
∑
 
 
 
 (5) 
€ 
FinancialPerformanceit+1 = α0 +α1OVERALLit +α2KLD_VARit +α3GRIit +
+α4KLD_VARit *GRIit +α5sizeit + α6ind Industryit ind
ind =1
8
∑
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables included in the study. 
Results show that all variables are related in a meaningful way and that all of the hypothesized 
associations between variables are statistically significant. Table 2 provides results for the 
regression analyses relative to hypothesis 1, which predicted that the instrumental approach to CSR 
is associated with superior company performance in terms of short-term measures. Although all 
four models designed to test the relationship between CSR and CP are statistically significant4, the 
measure of CSR performance (OVERALL) is not significantly associated with any measure of CP, 
so the level of CSP reported in KLD has no association with CP. However, when the measures 
reported in KLD are used with an instrumental approach (KLD_VAR), which is selectively focused 
on key stakeholders, it has a statistically significant association with short-term measures of 
performance—both EBITDA and market value. This result provides support for hypothesis 1. It is 
also worth noting that the instrumental approach to CSR shows no association with medium-term 
                                                
4 Wald chi-square tests present p-values equal to 0. For panel-corrected standard errors linear models, the Wald chi-
square test is analogous to the F statistics in OLS. 
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measures of performance.  In addition the test for interaction between high levels of CSP and the 
instrumental approach shows no significant association with any of the four measures of CP. This 
result indicates that it is the approach to CSR, more than the level of CSP that accounts for the 
difference in CP. 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
Table 3 provides results of the regression analyses designed to test hypothesis 2, which 
predicted that the descriptive approach to CSR is associated with superior company performance in 
terms of medium-term measures. While Panel A shows the regression results of the association 
between the descriptive approach to CSR and CP using concurrent measures of CP, Panel B 
presents the results of the same relationship with CP measured after a one-year lag. The descriptive 
approach was measured using the GRI guidelines (GRI) and the level of compliance with the GRI 
guidelines (DSCORE). Once again, all of the models tested in Panel A and Panel B are significant 
(Wald Chi Square greater than 100). The adoption of GRI has negative and significant association 
with capital expenditures, in terms of both concurrent and lagged measures. While the level of 
compliance with GRI guidelines (DSCORE) is not associated with any measure of performance, 
concurrent or lagged, the interaction term measuring GRI adoption and level of compliance has a 
significant association with capital expenditure in terms of both concurrent and lagged measures. 
Intangibles, the other measure of medium-term performance is not associated with either the 
adoption of GRI or the level of GRI compliance. These results can be interpreted as providing 
partial and weak support for hypothesis 2.    
Insert Table 3 about here 
Finally, Table 4 shows the results of regression analyses designed to test the third 
hypothesis, which predicted that a combination of the descriptive and instrumental approach in 
ways that lead to a strategic CSR approach is associated with superior CP in terms of both the short-
term and the medium-term measures. Panel A presents the regression results of the relationship 
between the combined approach (descriptive and instrumental) to CSR in terms of concurrent 
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performance measures. The interaction term KLD_VAR*GRI, which is designed to investigate the 
association between the strategic use of the combined approach to CSR and CP shows a significant 
association between the combined approach and three of the four performance measures—EBITDA 
(a short-term measure), capital expenditure and intangibles (both medium-term measures). When 
this association was examined using the lagged measure of performance (Panel B), results were 
similar; but the association with EBITDA was absent, while the association with enterprise value (a 
short-term measure) and capital expenditure (a medium-term measure) was significant.  Although 
these results provide some support for hypothesis 3, the nature and stability of the association 
between the combined approach is not conclusive.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
DISCUSSION 
In order to clarify the CSR-CP relationship, this study examined how companies approach 
the task of managing their relationships with their stakeholders and whether differences in the 
approach to CSR are associated with the CSR-CP relationship. An argument was made that the 
choice a company makes in terms of the approach that it adopts to CSR has a bearing on the 
company’s conception of what constitutes effective stakeholder management, its crafting of 
corporate social initiatives, and the performance goals that it wishes to achieve through these 
initiatives. The results indicate that that each of the three approaches to CSR—descriptive, 
instrumental, and strategic—are associated with CP, but in different ways.   
In following the instrumental approach, managers are drawn into relationships with 
stakeholders based upon preferences accorded to one stakeholder group over the other in order to 
achieve outcomes related to short-term measures of CP. Results related to the tests for this 
hypothesis show that the instrumental approach to CSR has a positive association with both of the 
short-term measures of CP used in the study—EBITDA and market value—but no association with 
the medium-term measures of CP. These findings provide support for the claim made by scholars 
who are proponents of instrumental approach to the CSR, that in order to realize the true impact of 
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CSR, companies must move away from indiscriminate investments in social value creation and 
choose the social issues on which to focus (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Peloza, 2006). Although 
such an approach may appear to be pragmatic, it does not address the more complex debate in the 
social accounting literature concerning the nature of the relationship between business and society5. 
When companies adopt a descriptive approach to CSR, they try to satisfy the demands of 
diverse stakeholder groups by pursuing a host of social initiatives that may or may not be directly 
related to CP goals. Companies that adopt this approach also participate in voluntary reporting 
mechanisms designed to inform the diverse stakeholder groups whose interests they are trying to 
fulfill about their social performance. Such an approach to CSR, if it is based on an efficient 
management strategy of investment in the future, will be associated with CP in terms of medium-
term measures—expenditures in capital investment targeted at improving stakeholder relationships 
and will be manifest in higher levels of intangibles for the company. Results of the study provided 
only weak and partial support for this assertion.  While the adoption of the descriptive approach 
does appear to be associated with capital expenditure, it does not have an association with 
intangibles.  Results also showed a significant interaction effect between the descriptive approach 
and the level of reporting (DSCORE) in terms of capital expenditure; indicating that companies that  
pursue the descriptive approach to CSR and have higher levels of reporting, have a stronger 
association between their CSR initiatives and medium-term measures of performance (capital 
expenditure) than do companies with low levels of reporting. 
The failure to find an association with intangibles (as hypothesized) may perhaps be because 
many companies that adopt this approach report their social responsibility credentials in an attempt 
to enhance their company image and build corporate reputation, rather than use them as an 
investment for building improved stakeholder relationships. Such findings lend credence to the 
criticism from scholars who contend that the concept of CSR, in practice, is often reduced to giving 
basic information on indicators that comprise the TBL (Chatterji and Levine, 2006) and that 
                                                
5 The authors thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing out this limitation, noted here and elsewhere in the paper. 
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reporting mechanisms are essentially window dressing (Moneva et al., 2006). It, therefore, appears 
reasonable to conclude that, while the CSR initiatives that follow the descriptive approach may 
have the potential to build long-term propositions that characterize sound stakeholder relationships, 
but to the extent that they are used as exercises in public relations, media campaigns, and reputation 
building, they do not contribute to improvements in CP. 
The strategic approach to CSR is based on the thinking that stakeholder management and 
CSR are fundamentally pragmatic concepts. Companies have finite resources, and managers try to 
deal efficiently with many pressures exerted by stakeholder groups. Prior research has found that 
some types of corporate responses to stakeholders are more effective than others. For example, 
Hillman and Keim (2001) found that, while effective stakeholder management leads to improved 
value creation for companies and stakeholders, pro forma participation in social issues can detract 
from that value. Following this line of thinking, we tested the hypothesis that adopting an 
integrative approach to CSR that strategically combines the descriptive and instrumental approaches 
may lead to sustained improvement in CP (i.e., it will be associated with superior performance in 
terms of both short-term and medium-term measures). Results of the tests for hypothesis 3 generally 
support this assertion, as the strategic approach to CSR has significant association with both short-
term and medium-term performance measures, both with concurrent and lagged measures of 
performance. These results, although tentative, do provide support for the assertion that when 
companies shift away from the fragmented and diffused approach that often characterizes the 
instrumental approach and away from generic social initiatives that are often inherent in the 
descriptive approach to identify and prioritize social issues in a unified way, both the company and 
its stakeholders stand to benefit (Porter and Kramer, 2011).  However, such a conclusion can only 
be treated as tentative, until confirmed by future studies. 
IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 Although results of this study show that investing in stakeholder management and CSR may 
be complementary to CP goals and may provide a basis for superior performance, scholars have 
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expressed reservations about the ability of the reporting standards, guidelines, and rankings to 
influence corporate social behaviors constructively (e.g. Gray, 2010).  The social accounting 
literature has been critical of the shortcomings of these reporting mechanisms and noted that these 
reports and rankings may or may not contribute to heightened accountability and may or may not 
constructively influence corporate social behavior.  The Critical Theorists, in particular, have 
argued that “...corporate sustainability accounting is the cause and source of corporate sustainability 
problems...” because “...conventions are not fit for the purpose of recording and disclosing 
information about corporate, social and environmental impacts” (Buritt and Schaltegger, 2010, p. 
829). 
A recent study that examined corporate reporting of social responsibility noted that there is a 
“…reduced emphasis on normative principles and rather simplistic pursuit of “objective” 
measurement” (Joseph, 2012, p. 93).  Since this study could not examine the association between 
the normative approach to CSR and CP, we are unable to engage critically with the ongoing debate 
in this area.  The findings of the present study, nonetheless, contribute to this ongoing debate by 
showing that, more than being a good citizen or trying to address the concerns of myriad 
stakeholders, managers must develop more strategic forms of corporate social initiatives that are 
capable of engaging and empowering stakeholders while delivering returns to the company. 
However, we acknowledge that such a “middle ground approach” (Gray et al., 1988), pragmatic and 
even expedient as it may appear to be, carries the risk of making managers fall “down the hole in 
the middle of the road” (Tinker et al., 1991) because many contemporary issues related to business 
and society are contested and unstable. 
This study has a number of limitations associated with the choice of sample and the way in 
which it operationalized approaches to CSR. Perhaps the most serious limitation stems from the 
manner in which we measured the approaches to CSR. While using the variances among and 
between companies’ CSP from a database that lists the CSP of the one hundred best companies may 
be valid for the purpose of this research, it does not capture all of the intricacies involved in taking 
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the instrumental approach. The same can be said about using GRI to measure the descriptive 
approach. Future research studies can overcome this limitation by finding better measures, such as 
analysis of company reports, to determine which approach a company uses.  The study was also 
unable to examine the association between normative approach to CSR and CP.  Future researchers 
can examine the presence of normative approach by collecting data on the value orientation of 
managers and then relating them to CSR initiatives of the company. 
The generalizability of the findings of the study is also somewhat limited, given that the 
sample consisted of only the 188 most highly rated companies. It remains uncertain whether these 
results will hold with a larger cross-section of companies. Finally, researchers are well advised to 
examine the CSR-CP relationship over a longer period, considering that CSR initiatives may have a 
lagged relationship with CP.  
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Table 1. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlation+ of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 OVERALL 0.71 0.25 1 0.39** 0.31** 0.38** 0.22** 0.23** 0.17** 0.23** 
2 KLD_VAR 0.33 0.47 0.43** 1 0.34** 0.33** 0.42** 0.42** 0.32** 0.29** 
3 GRI 0.16 0.37 0.29** 0.31** 1 0.78** 0.36* 0.34** 0.21** 0.33** 
4 DSCORE 0.11 0.21 0.36** 0.27** 0.78** 1 0.33** 0.30** 0.20** 0.30** 
5 EBITDAa  2,358 4,569 0.20** 0.40** 0.43** 0.36** 1 0.93* 0.76** 0.72** 
6 ENT_VALUEa 34,928 94,418  0.10 0.31** 0.23**    0.14* 0.92** 1 0.72** 0.72** 
7 INTANGIBLESa  451 888 0.28** 0.33** 0.39** 0.40** 0.72** 0.40** 1 0.61** 
8 CAP_EXPENDa  2,873 7,779  0.11 0.28** 0.31** 0.21** 0.72** 0.67** 0.45** 1 
a In thousands of USD 
* significant at <.05 ** significant at <.01 
+Lower diagonal: Pearson’s correlation; Upper diagonal: Spearman’s Correlation 
 
35 
 
Table 2. Regression Models for the Instrumental Approach to CSR and Performance 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 EBITDA ENT_VALUE CAP_EXPEND INTANGIBLES 
OVERALL 1,277 20,485 177 1,026 
  [0.18] [0.17] [0.35] [0.56] 
KLD_VAR         2,852*          75,433* -58 3,599 
  [0.03] [0.01] [0.83] [0.16] 
KLD_VAR*OVER. -1,679         49,743 322 -2,485 
 [0.29] [0.07] [0.38] [0.41] 
Constant        -12,936**         -159,053**           2,089**   -17,065** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Observations      271         281       282      260 
Number of clusters      171         176       177      164 
Wald chi-square  100.77 94.88 101.78 68.15 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R squared 0.45 0.24 0.40 0.24 
        
* significant at <.05 ** significant at <.01 
Control variables (size and industry) are not reported in the table. 
p-values are in brackets. 
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Table 3. Regression Models for the Descriptive Approach to CSR and Performance 
 
Panel A. Concurrent financial performance  
        1     2 3         4 
  EBITDA ENT_VALUE CAP_EXPEND INTANGIBLES 
GRI          904 52,695                -974* 7,919 
      [0.73] [0.32] [0.04] [0.14] 
DSCORE       -170 -26 -218 -1 
 [0.81] [0.14] [0.38] [0.54] 
GRI*DSCORE 4,360 -12,69               3,146** -7,296 
 [0.35] [0.88] [0.00] [0.39] 
Constant -11,863** -151,848**              -1,955**       -15,386** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Observations 271 281 282 260 
Number of cluster 170 175 176 163 
Wald chi-square  192.29 114.10 150.42 87.87 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R squared 0.47               0.22 0.474 0.271 
 
 
Panel B. Lagged financial performance (t+1) 
         1        2          3        4 
  EBITDA ENT_VALUE CAP_EXPEND INTANGIBLES 
GRI -1,406 -10,707 -1,679** 1,186 
 [0.53] [0.62] [0.00] [0.80] 
DSCORE 157 36,329 -3,184 2,902 
 [0.99] [0.86] [0.05] [0.94] 
GRI*DSCORE 5,356 -2,170 7,763** 731 
 [0.76] [0.99] [0.00] [0.98] 
Constant -19,179** -201,776** -2,744**    -31,163** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Observations 92 97 97 91 
Number of cluster 65 69 69 66 
Wald chi-square  140.03 167.97 94.83 19.48 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R squared 0.68 0.26 0.62 0.30 
 
* significant at <.05 ** significant at <.01 
Control variables (size and industry) are not reported in the table. 
p-values are in brackets. 
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Table 4. Regression Models for the Strategic Approach to CSR (Combining Instrumental and 
Descriptive Approaches) and Performance 
Panel A. Concurrent financial performance  
  1 2 3 4 
  EBITDA ENT_VALUE CAP_EXPEND INTANGIBLES 
OVERALL -327 -18,177 356 -1,053 
  [0.73] [0.28] [0.08] [0.61] 
GRI 806 19,422  -173 -323 
 [0.26] [0.06] [0.18] [0.79] 
KLD_VAR 779  33,794  -7 103 
  [0.06] [0.05] [0.93] [0.89] 
KLD_VAR*GRI         2,917* 13,262             801**   6,506* 
  [0.04] [0.66] [0.00] [0.05] 
Constant       -10,811**     -125,019**          -2,024**        -13,985** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Observations 271 281 282 260 
Number of cluster 170 175 176 163 
Wald chi-square 76.95 56.86 63.60 56.55 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R squared 0.50 0.25 0.44 0.29 
 
Panel B. Lagged financial performance (t+1) 
 
  1 2 3 4 
  EBITDA ENT_VALUE CAP_EXPEND INTANGIBLES 
OVERALL 70 -17,100 187 3,820 
  [0.96] [0.50] [0.60] [0.18] 
GRI 224 30,145 -295 -2,290 
 [0.85] [0.08] [0.26] [0.42] 
KLD_VAR 71         46,151* 68 -2,476 
  [0.30] [0.03] [0.65] [0.38] 
KLD_VAR*GRI 1,060    43,805*                933* 6,999 
  [0.52] [0.05] [0.04] [0.34] 
Constant -18,318**     -170,151**         -2,363**        -33,022** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Observations 92 97 97 91 
Number of cluster 65 69 69 66 
Wald chi-square 192.32 89.80 132.23 46.76 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R squared 0.68 0.29 0.51 0.32 
 
* significant at <.05 ** significant at <.01 
Control variables (size and industry) are not reported in the table. 
p-values are in brackets. 
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Appendix-A. Measures of Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables 
Variable Definition 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization at the 
end of each fiscal year 
ENT_VALUE Company market value at the end of each fiscal year 
CAP_EXPENDITURE Capital expenditures at the end of each fiscal year 
INTANGIBLES Total value of intangible assets at the end of the fiscal year 
OVERALL Average of KLD social performance scores of a company across seven 
areas 
KLD_VAR Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the variance of a company was 
greater than the average variance for all observations for a given year, 
and 0 otherwise 
GRI Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the company volunteered to apply 
the GRI guidelines to its CSR reporting, and 0 otherwise  
DSCORE Level of compliance with GRI (measured as the number of indicators 
on which the company reported, out of the 79 GRI indicators) 
Size Natural logarithm of the number of employees 
Basic industries Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if company is in a basic industry, 
and 0 otherwise 
 
